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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
CIVIL NO. 7998 
OTHO R. MURPHY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GRAND C~OUNTY, UTAH, 
a body corporate and politic, 
and MARGIE M. SHAFER, 
County Clerk of Grand Coun-
ty, Utah, and Ex-Officio 
County Auditor, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF GRAND c·ouNTY, UTAH. 
BRIEF OF DEFEN'DANTS AI'~D APPElLANTS. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 3, 1950, the Board of County Commissioners 
of Grand co~1:aty, Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Board," 
~tt a n1eeting regularly held, fixed the salary of the county 
attorney of Grand county, Utah, for the· term com1nencing 
J·anuary 1, 1951, at $10.00 per annum. The fixing of the 
salary was done pursuant to Section 19-13-15 U. C. A. 1943, 
novv being s~~ction 17-16-15 U. C. A. 1953. Notice that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
salary had been so fixed was given in the Tin1es-Inde~en­
dent, a weekly newspaper published in Moab, Utah, ~~nrl 
which has general circulation in Grand county. X o one pro-
tested the action of the board in so fixing the salary. 
The general election for the election of county officers 
for the year 1950 was held in Grand county on November 
7, 1950, so that the salary of the county attorney was fix-
ed more than six months prior thereto as required by law. 
Within the time required by law for the filing for county 
offices no person filed for the office of county attorne~,·, 
an office Which was to be filled at the general election to 
be held in November of that year, and on the ballot which 
was prepared and used at said general election no name ap-
peared thereon for the office of county attorney for Gr3nd 
county. 
On the day of the election the name of Otho R. Mur-
phy, the plaintiff herein, was written in on the ballot for 
the offioo of county attorney and he received a total of 44 
votes for that office, which was the highest number of 
votes received by anyone for the office of county attorney. 
The total vote cast in Grand county at that general elec-
tion was 870 votes. 
On or about January 1, 1951, the plaintiff, pursuant 
to such "write-in" vote, qualified for the office of count~· 
attorney by taking his oath and furnishing his bond as 1\.:-
quired by law. On November 5, 1951 the plaintiff present-
ed to the Board his claim for salary as county attorney 
for the months of January through October, 1951, based on 
the rate of $1,000 per annum, which was the salary pre-
viously fixed and paid to the county attorney of Grand 
county and whose term had expired on January 1, 1951. 
The Board refused to pay said claim for the reason that the 
salary of the county attorney had been fixed by the Board 
at its meeting of April 3, 1950 at $10 per annum and not 
at $1,000 per annum. After the refusal of the Board to ap-
prove plaintiff's claim, he brought action in the District 
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Court of Grand county. Utah, to recover his salary based 
on the rate of $1,000 per annum. The District Court upheld 
plaintiff's contention that he should be allowed the salary 
of his predecessor in office, na.me1y, 1$1,000 per annum, and 
hence this appeal from that decision. 
S'fATEl\'IENT OF POINTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRE'D IN FINDING THAT 
THE BOARD, IN FIXING THE SALARY OF THE COUN-
TY ATTORNEY OF GRAND COUNTY AT $10 PE'R AN-
NUM, FAILED TO EXERCISE A FAIR AND REASON-
ABLE DISCRETION AND TI-IAT THE AMOU~~T SO FIX-
ED AMO·UNTED TO NO CO·l\1PENSATION AT ALL, AND 
THAT SUCH AC.TION OF THE BOARD W!AS CALCU-
LATED TO DI8CO~URAGE ANYONE FROM SEE·KING 
THE OFFICE OF COUNTY ATTORNE··y. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING FROM 
DEFENDANTS ANSWER THE THIRD AND FO·URTI-I 
DE:FENSES, NAMELY: 
(A) THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPE:D 
FROM MAKING ANY CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFEN-
DANTS FOR ANY SALAR.Y OTHER THAN THE AN-
NUAL SALARY OF $10 PER YEAR AS FIXED BY LAvV. 
(B) THAT THE D·EFENDP.tNT COUNTY AUDITOIR 
IS PREVENTED BY SEiCTION 17-:-19-23 U. C. A. 1953 
FROM DRAWING A W A·RRANT ON COUN'rY FUNDS 
EXCEPT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF TH~ BUDGET 
PASSED AND ADOPTE.D BY THE BO~ARD. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
ONLY BOARD8 OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
ARE A UTHO~RIZE.D BY LAW TO FIX SALARIES OF 
COUNTY OFFICE~R,S. 
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The office of county attorney in this state is an office 
created by Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution of 
Utah. And the powers and duties of the county attorney 
are set forth in Chapter 18, Title 17, U. C. A. 1953. 
The power to fix salaries of county officers in this 
state is given to the boards of county commissioners by 
Sections 17-16-14 and 17-1~6-15 U. C. A. 1953. At the time 
the salary of the county attorney was fixed by the Board 
on April 3, 1950, Grand county was a class 4 county. The 
maximum salary for the county attorney of a class 4 coun-
ty at that time was $1800. The statute places no minin1um 
as to salaries; this resting within the discretion of the 
boards of county commissioners. 
Section 17-16-14 U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides 
that "The annual salaries of the officers of all counties in 
the state shall be fixed by the respective boards of county 
commissioners at not to exceed the following amounts;'' 
and the section then sets forth the various amounts. Our 
Suprem.e Court in the case of Johnson v Bankhead, (Utah 
1951), 232 P 2d 372, said this about Section 17-16-14: 
"There is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language of Section 19-13-14 (now Section 17-16-14) 
above quoted. It expressly fixes only the maximum 
within which the board of commissioners are limit-
ed in fixing the salary and expressiy places on such 
boards the duty to fix such salary within such lim-
its." 
Under the ruling of Johnson v Bankhead, supra, it 
has been established that the boards of commissioners 
have the authority to fix the salaries of county officer~. 
including that of county attorney, within the limits of Sec-
tion 17-16-14. 
The time when salaries of county officers are to be 
fixed is provided for in Section 17-16-15, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended, which section reads as follows: 
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"The board of county commissioners shall bi-
ennially, at a m€eting held at least six months prior 
to the election of county officers, fix and determine 
the salaries of county officers, for whon1 n1aximum 
salaries are fixed, for the term next succ'(~eding; pro-
vided, that the salaries of such officers shall not be 
diminished or increased for the term for vvhich they 
were elected and shall have qualifi·~d; anj provided 
further, that should any board fail to fix the sal-
ary of any of the county officers as provided in this 
section, the salary of the predecessor of said offi-
cer whose salary has been fixed shall apply; provid-
ed, hovvever, said boards of county commi~sioners 
may within six months of the effective date of this 
act fix the salaries of county officers in amounts 
which in their opinion will establish sufficient and 
proper salaries for services rendered or to be ren-
dered by officers whose salaries are so fixed; and 
provided further that the maximum salaries for 
county officers shall not exceed in amount the max-
imum salaries as set forth in section 17-16-14 here-
of." 
The defendants, through its Board, having fixed the 
salary of the county attorney within the limits and vvithin 
th'8 time allowed by the above quoted section, by what 
right then had the trial judge to hold such action a nullity 
and thus attempt to compel the defendants to pay to the 
plaintiff a salary of $1000 per annum? 
II 
THE ACTION OF THE DEFENDANT BO·ARD IN 
FIXING THE SALARY OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
CANN:OT BE SET ASIDE UNLESS THE\ EVIDENC'E 
CLEARLY SHOWS AN ABUSE OF DISCR.ETION. 
In this action the plaintiff at no time presented any 
evidence to the trial court upon which the court could sup-
port its finding number 6, which reads: 
"That in fixing the salary for the office of coun-
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ty attorney of Grand county at $10 per annum t.ht: 
Board of County Commissioners -o.f said county fail-
ed to exercise a fair and reasonabl·e discretion in that 
the sum so fixed was so sm.all as to amount to no 
. compensation at all for the duties imposed bv la'Y 
upon the office of county attorney and was Calcu-
lated to discourage anyone from seeking said of-
fice, or to limit aspirants to those willing to render 
service gratuitously, in violation of the provisions 
of Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution of 
the state of Utah as amended, that 'A county atLor-
ney shall be elected by the qualified voters of ea(' h 
county ... ' " 
No authority need be cited in support of the n1le which 
requires that findings must be supported by the evidence. 
The burden in this case was upon the plaintiff to prove 
that the defendant Board at the time it fixed the salary of 
the county attorney at $10 per annum abused its discre-
tionary power. The plaintiff having failed to introduce any 
evidence whatsoever in this action cannot now recover, for 
the rule is that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
there is always a presumption that the official acts of 
county and other officers have properly been performed. 
See 31 C. J. S., Section 146, pages 798-826. 
In Cawsey vs Brickey, 82 Wash. 653, 14-~ P. 938, 
an action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of 
an order creating a game preserve and it was con-
tended that the powers exercised by the body cre-
ating the preserve were arbitrarily exercised. Tht~ 
court failed to find sufficient evidence of arbitrary 
action to warrant interference with the order cre-
ating the preserve and on the question of abuse of 
power, the court said : 
"It is also true that any discretionary power 
may be abused, but an abuse will not be assumed in 
the absence of clear and convincing evidence. Evrr~r 
reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of 
the regularity and good faith of official action. 
Tainter v. Lucas, 29 Wis. 375; Quigley v. Phelps, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
7 4 \Y ~1__sh. 73, 132 Pac. 738." 
"It will be presumed, in the absence of proof 
to the contrary, that the board of county cornmis-
sioners did its duty and informed itself of the facts, 
and that the statements contained in its resolution, 
with respect to the warrant indebtedness to be 
funded, are true." Lloyd Corporation v. Bannock 
County et al, (Idaho, 1933), 25 P. 2d 217. 
"County Com1nissioners ~re presumed to do 
their duty and to exercis€ fairly their discretion. If 
they abuse their discretion, the people have a re-
medy at the polls, if no other be provided." State v. 
Mills, (Mont. 1927) 261 P. 885. 
"The county cornmissioners are public officers 
and are presumed to properly discharge the duties 
which the law imposes upon them .. 
"In the case of Bonaparte v. Nelson, 142 Okl. 
54, 285 P. 100, 102, this court said: 'The excise 
boards, like municipal boards and other public of-
ficers, are presumed to discharge the duties which 
the law imposes upon them, and the same is true 
relative to the board of county commissioners * * * 
and in the absence of proof it will be presumed that 
the officers, upon whom acts and duties are enjoin-
ed by law, performed those duties. This presump-
tion continues in favor of the acts of such officers 
until it is affirmatively shown by competent evi-
dence to the contrary.' " Jackson v. Sadler et al, Old. 
1935, 44 p. 2d 838. 
The reading of the above authorities can lead to but 
one conclusion, that is, that unless the evidence shows an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the county commission-
ers, it will be presumed that they have discharged their 
duty according to law and that they have acted fairly, im-
partially and in good faith. In . the case at bar, the plain-
tiff failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever with res-
pect to an abuse of discretion or lack of good faith on the 
part of the county comn1issioners in fixing the salary and 
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having so failed to introduce any evidence, his case n1ust 
fail for it will then be presumed, in the absence of such evi-
dence, that the commissioners acted in good faith and did 
not abuse their discretionary po'\ver granted to them by 
law. In the absence of any evidence that the co1nmissioners 
abused their discretionary power the court, in order to 
find such an abuse of discretion in the instant case, would 
be compelled to substitute its opinion and judgement for 
that of the board of county commissioners v1hich, it is sub-
mitted, the court can not do. 
In Reynolds v Board of Commissioners, 6 Tdaho 787, 
59 P. 730 (1899) an action was brought by certain officers 
of Oneida county against the Boar.d of Commissioners for 
lowering certain salaries. The salaries fixed by the com-
missioners were as follows: Clerk of the District Court, 
$900 per annum; Sheriff, $900 per annum; Superintendent 
of Schools, $500 per annum and the Treasurer, $500 per an-
num. The District ·Court rendered judgament modifying 
the order of the Board and increased the salaries above 
the figures fixed by the Board. From this j udg•ment the 
Board appealed to the Supreme court which, on appeal, re-
versed the lower court and had this to say : 
"It is a well-settled rule that a power or func-
tion vested solely in one department, body, board, 
or tribunal by express constitutional provisions can-
not be delegated by such department, body, board, 
or tribunal to another department, body, board, or 
tribunal. The legislature cannot delegate the func-
tions expressley vested in it by the constitution to 
boards of county commissioners or to the judiciary . 
. . . The duty which devolves upon the county com-
missioners under the act in question is a delicate, 
and will generally be found to be a difficult, one. 
They are called upon to exercise a judicial discretion, 
and to act so as to carry out the intent of the stn-
tute, with due regard for the rights and interests of 
both officeholder and taxpayer. Their a('tion involvt\~ 
judicial discretion. They act, not as :1 legislative 
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body, but quasi judicially. More or less trouble will 
grow out of their actions under said statute. T~ey 
have conflicting interests to consider and determinE\ 
On the one hand, officeholders will desire large sal-
aries, while the taxpayers will desire the salaries 
fixed as low as possible. But the interests of all -
both officehold€r and taxpayer - demand that sal-
aries should be fixed at such sums as will reason-
ably compensate each officer for his time and labor, 
taking into consideration the qualifications neces-
sary to be possessed by each county officer, and the 
responsibilities of his office. All of these matters 
should be carefully investigated and determined by 
the board of commissioners. The board should ex-
ercise the discretion vested in it with due re~~·ard 
for the rights of all parties concerned. 
"The action of the board should not be distuTb-
ed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion sho~rn, 
which cannot be shown merely by the opinion of 
the district court." 
"Appellants argue that no law was violated by 
the board, and that the respondents had no legal 
rights to be violated at the time the salaries were 
fixed; that \Vhatever legal right they have to com-
pensation was created by the order appealed from. 
We do not agree with this contention. The act in 
question vests in each county officer in the state 
the right to compensation which is, within the max-
imum and minimum prescribed, reasonable, con·" 
sidering the circumstances surounding and affect-
ing each office. Each taxpayer and officeholder has 
the right to have the board of commissioners in his 
county exercise its discretion in the matt-er of fixing 
such salaries as will afford to each .officer reason-
able compensation,. thus protecting public interests. 
Each taxpayer also has a legal right to have the 
county treasury protected against an abuse of the 
discretion vested in the board, by way of profligate 
extravagance. If the theory of the appellants be cor-
rect, that the action of the board is final and can-
not be reviewed by the courts, the taxpayer in one 
of the smaller counties may see the salaries fixed 
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10 
at the maximum, without regard to th·2 amot~nt of 
labor to be performed, or other circumstances, con-
trary to public interests, and be pow-?rless to re-
medy the wrong. No such thing \vas contemplated. 
The theory upon which the case of Stookey v. Board 
(Idaho) 57 Pac. 312, - which is hereby affirmed, 
- was decided, is that the boards of comn1issionera 
must, within the discretion vested in them. allow 
reasonable compensation by way of annual salaries, 
when acting und€r the provisions of the act in ques-
rtion. It was only upon the theory that we could hold 
said act to be general and not special legislation. 
lJnder this theory, the act is uniform in its opera-
tion throughout the state. Under any other theor~r, 
we would be compelled to hold it local and special, 
and inhibited by the constitution. "While it seems 
that the board of commissioners fixed th•c salaries 
in question very low, and 'fNhile the amounts fixed 
by the district court do not seem extravagant. yet 
it does not sufficiently appear from the record be-
fore us that the board of commis-sioners abused its 
discretion in making the order appealed from." 
See also Criddle v Board of Con1missioners, 248 P. 465 
(Idaho 1926); Etter v Board of Commissioners 255 P. 1095 
(Idaho 1927) ; Dygert v Board of Commissioners, 129 P 2d. 
660 (Idaho 1942) ; State ex rei Yeargin v Maschke, et al., 
155 P. 1064 (Wash. 1916); Benham v McLaughlin, 204 P. 
1050 (Wash. 1922).; State, ex rel v Hinkle, 206 P. 942 
(Wash. 1922). 
There is no evidence in this case to show what motivat-
ed the Board in fixing the salary of the county attorney 
at $10 per annum. The trial judge without any evidence be-
fore him found that the action of the Board was "calculat-
ed to discourage anyone from seeking said office, or to limit 
aspirants to those willing to render service gratuitously." 
The plaintiff is not now and at no time has he been a mem-
ber of the bar of this or any other state. If we are to spec-
ulate, as the trial judge did, on what motivated the Board 
in fixing the salary at so low a figure, can it not be said 
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that theBoard had in mind the protection of the forgotten 
taxpayer. It is possible that the Board anticipated that orJ.(~ 
not qualified to fulfill the office of county attorney would 
attempt to be elected, as was the plaintiff. The Board was 
under no obligation, legal or humanitarian, to provide out 
of the taxpayers money a large salary in the nature of a 
gift to one not able to perform the duties of county attor-
ney. 
In the absence of evidence showing an abuse of discre-
tion the trial court cannot set up its j udgament against the 
judgament of the Board as to what is a reasonable com-
pensation for services to be performed by a county attor~ 
ney. It is to the judgament and diseretion of the boards 
of county commission~rs, and not to trial judges, that the 
legislature of this state left the decision and power in such 
matters. 
We quote from the leading case of Dillon v Whatcom 
County, 41 P. 174 (Wash. 1895): 
"It would seem that absolute discretion could 
not be vested in a tribunal if it has not been vested 
in the board of county commissioners by this sec-
tion, so far as the hiring of extra help for county 
officers is concerned; and, outside of the . construc-
tion which we would be compelled to place upon it 
from the language of the law itself, the authorities, 
it seems to us, are uniform on this proposition. Be-
fore proceeding to their investigation, in view of 
some authorities which have been cited by the res-
pondent, it is well to notice this distinction, v1hich 
we think is frequently lost sight of in the discus-
sion of such cases, viz. that the courts will interfere 
to compel inferior tribunals to act or to 'exercise 
their discretion in proper cases, when such tribun-
als claim that under the law they have no right to 
act, the question of whether or not they have a 
right to act being a legal question which the courts 
will solve for the tribunals; but this must be dis-
tinguished from a case where the legislature has 
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empowered the tribunal with discrE·l:ion, and 3~1 ch 
tribunal has exercised that discretion. 
"In such a case the courts have no rig-ht to SLl~'­
stitute their judgement for the judgement of the 
tribunal in which th'c discretion has bee:~. vested; 
and we think an investigation of the authorities will 
show that in all well-considered cases this distinc-
tion has been steadily kept in view. In this case, this 
discretion having been vested by the legislature in 
the board of county commissioners, and the ques-
tion as to the necessity of this extrr. help ha ,.j ng 
been submitted especially to th,air judgement, and, 
as shown by the answer, they having exercised their 
judgement and arrived at a conclusion, such a con-
clusion is final, and not subject to review by the 
courts." 
What i~ arbitrary or capricious action or an abuse of 
discretion? 
" .... The most that can be said of their action, 
even from the respondent's point of view, is that 
they erred in judgment. But this is not arbitrary 
or capricious action. These terms, when used in this 
connection, must mean willful and unreasoning 
action, action without consideration and in disregard 
of the facts and circumstances of the case. Action 
is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised hon-
estly and upon due consideration, where there is 
room for two opinions, however much it may be be-
lieved that an erroneous conclusion was reached." 
Sweitzer v. Industrial Commission of Washington, 
199 P. 724 (Wash. 1921). 
In C'riddle v Board of Commissioners, 248 P. 465 (Ida-
ho 1926) the court in discussing "abuse of discretion" said: 
"The discretion in the matter is specifically 
vested in the board, and an abuse of the board's dis-
cretion is not shown by the fact that the able trial 
judge would have exercised the discretion different-
ly had it been reposed· in him. Sullivan v. Board of 
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Com'rs, 22 Idaho, 202, 125 P. 191. On the contrary, 
an abuse of discretion occurs when the tribunal or 
board, charged vvith its exercise, 'exceeds the 
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it 
being considered.' Independent Steel & Wir•a Co. v. 
New Mexico Cent. R. Co., 25 N.M. 160, 178 P. 842; 
Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1, 16 P. 345; Root v. Bing-
ham, 26 S.D. 118, 128 N. W. 132 .. A.n 'abuse of dis-
cretion' * * * is really a discretion 'exercised to an 
end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, 
reason and evidence.' Murray v. Buell, 7 4 vVis. 14, 41 
N. W. 1010. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in 
Northern Trust c·o. y. Snyder, 113 Wis. 516. 89 N. 
W. 460, 90 Am. St. Rep. 867, said: 
" 'Where it rests in the discretion of the coun-
ty board to determine what is a reasonable compen-
sation, the court should not revise their action in 
the absence of clear evidence of such manifest abuse 
of power and disregard of the statute as to show _ 
that the board failed to exercise a legal discretion. 
* * *' " . 
With no evidence before the trial court wherein can 
it be found in the record before this court that the defen-
dant Board "exceeded the bounds of reason" or acted 
"without consideration and in disregard of the facts and 
circumstances of the case" when it fixed the salary of the 
county attorney on that 3rd day of April, 1950, its action 
being within the limits and power fixed and authorized by 
law? . 
If the defendant Board erred in judgment or did not 
fix the salary sufficiently high enough to satisfy the plain-
tiff then as the Supreme Court of Washington said in Dil-
lon v Whatcom County, supra: 
"If it eventuates that the board has not exer-
cised its discretion in a sensible way, or in such a 
way as to subserve the best interest of the county, 
the only remedy that the people have is the exer-
cise of an intelligent choice at the polls." 
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In Miles v Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 534, at page 537, 
it is said: 
"The court has no jurisdiction to direct, by 
mandamus, how the discretionary power, in the pre-
mises, vested in the board by the statute, shall be 
exercised." 
In this action the trial court found that the action of 
of the Board was a nullity and ordered that the defendants 
pay to the plaintiff a salary of $1000 per annum, which 
was the salary of plaintiff's predecessor in office. We sub-
mit that the court is without power to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the Board and increase the salary from $10 
to $1000 per annum. If the Board abused its discretion then 
it should be compelled to exercise it within reason and not 
be required to accept the judgment of the court as to what 
is a reasonable salary for the office of county attorney of 
Grand county. In Merwin v Board of Co1nmissioners, 67 P. 
285 (Colo. 1901), the Board fixed the salary of the deputy 
district attorney at $1.00 per annum and he brought action 
to 1"\~cover compensation for~' services rendered. In denying 
plaintiff's claim the court said : 
"* * * Another contention of plaintiff in error, 
either in this or another case between the same par-
ties (67 Pac. 1129), is that this is an equitable suit 
on. the part of the plaintiff, not to review a discre-
tionary action of the defendent in error, but for ap-
propriate relief where the board has absolutely re-
fused to exercise the power vested in it; that is to 
say, the fixing by the board of the plaintiff's salary 
at $1 a year is equivalent to no action at all, and 
therefore the judgment should be vacated, and an-
other one rendered for a reasonable sum in his fa-
vor. This contention is not good. If the action t<1ken 
by the board is in legal effect, no action at all, then 
the proper remedy is mandamus to con1pel action, 
not an action to recover on a quantum meruit. The 
court, might, in such a case, compel the board to 
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take action, but not to act in a particular \vay. And 
this leads us to remark that, as a conclusive reason 
why plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action, 
the legislature has not attempted to confer upon 
the courts i urisdiction to <}8termine the an1ount of 
the compen"sation to which he is entitled. ·The gen-
eral assembly itself has not fixed for deputy district 
attorneys, as such, any fees, or prescrib€d any def-
inite salary, but, on the contrary, has conferred up-
on the county commissioners power to fix the salary 
of the class to which plaintiff belongs at a sum not 
exceeding $1,500 a year. So that while, if the r..n.at-
ter could properly be brought before us for review~ 
we might agree with the counsel that the action 
of the commissioners i.n fixing plaintiff's salary at 
1$1 a year was wholly inexcusable, and entirely in-
adequate, still the fact that our judgment was dif-
ferent from theirs would not authorize us on this 
hearing to substitute our judgment for theirs, and 
enter judgment in an amount which we deemed a 
reasonable compensation. Where one ent-ers into a 
public office for which no compensation has been 
provided by law, he is presumed to give his s•2rvices; 
and where such compensation is conditional, as here, 
his right thereto does not attach until the condition 
is fulfilled or performed. 13 Cent. Law J. 444, and 
cases cited; People v. Superior Ct. of City of New 
York, 5 Wend. 115; Garfield Co. v. Leonard, 26 Colo. 
145, 57 Pac. 693. * * * " 
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, or 
an abuse of discretion, an order of a ·county board 
or other tribunal fixing or allowing compensation 
is not subject to review by the courts. Furthermore, 
under some statutes, even though an appeal can be 
taken, the court cannot itself fix the compensation, 
the only question for its determination being whe-
ther the board in making the order abused its dis-
cretion, and the court must affirm, modify, or re-
vers€ the order, make findings and conclusions, and 
remand the matter with instructions to the board 
to make an order accordingly." 20 C. J. S. page 935. 
We submit there is no statutory authority in our state 
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by which the courts in such cases as the one at bar can sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the board of county com-
missioners in the fixing of salaries of county officers. St1eh 
power is given only to the boards by law, and in the ab-
sence of proof showing an abuse of discretion, bad faith or 
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the board, 
can the courts set such action aside. No such proof being 
shoW!n by the plaintiff his case must fail. 
"The general rule of law is that public officials 
can only claim compensation for services rendered 
·where the compensation is provided by law, and that 
where no compensation is so provided the rendition 
of such services is d~amed to be gratuitous." State 
ex rel. Matson v O·'Hern, 65 P. 2d 619 (Mont. 1937). 
See also Maricopa County v Rodgers, 78 P. 2ct 989, 
(Ariz. 1938) ; McAuliffe v Kane, 128 P. 2d 932, (Cal. 1942); 
Board of Commissioners v Leonard, 57 P. 693 (Colo. 1899) ; 
1-Iillman v Chmelka, 195 P. 2d 945 (Colo. 1948) ; Merwin " 
Board of Commissioners, 67 P. 285 (Colo. 1901). 
III 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM 
MAKIN.G ANY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR 
ANY SALAR.Y OTHER THAN THE SUIY.l FIXED AC-
CORDING TO I_JA W BY THE DEFENDANT BOARI). 
/ 
The salary as fixed by t:he Board at $10 per annum 
was given notice by the Board to the public in the Times-
Independent, a weekly newspaper publi.shed in Moab, Grand 
county, in the April 6, 1950 issue. This was notice to the 
general public, including plaintiff, what the salary of ·n~c 
county attorney \vould be for the term commencing Janu-
ary 1, 1951. The plaintiff being charged with such noticl' 
of the salary so fixed permitted his name to be written in 
on the ballot at the general election of November 7, 1950, 
for the office of county attorney. It is submitted that un-
der such circumstances that the plaintiff should be estop-
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ped from making demand for a salary of $1000 per annun1 
on the ground that the action of the Board was a nullity 
and was calculated to prevent persons from seeking the 
office. At the time the salary was fixed the plaintiff nor 
any one else protested the action of the Board. It is thel"~-· 
fore assumed, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that 
the salary so fixed met the approval of the people of Grand 
county and that the Board acted within its authority. 
Plaintiff, knowing what the salary 'vas, should not now 
complain about bad faith or abuse of discretion on the rart 
of the Board. 
IV 
THE DEFENDANT COUNTY AUDITOR IS PRE-
VENTED BY SECTION 17-19-23, U. C. A. 1953 TO DRA Vl 
AWY vV ARRANT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF EX-
CEPT AS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE BUDGET 
PASSED BY DEFENDANT BOARD. 
Section 17-19-23, U. C. A. 1953 reads as follows: 
"County auditors shall not draw warrants on 
county funds except in accordanc'2 Yvith and v;ith;n 
the limits of the budget duly passed by the board of 
county commissioners." 
The budget of the defendant for the year 1951, as 
adopted according to law, appropriated the sum of $10 as 
salary for the office of county attorney. Under the above 
quoted section the defendant auditor is prevented from 
drawing a warrant in favor of the plaintiff in excess of 
such amount. 
In Williams v Board of Commissioners, 282 P. 867, 
(Idaho, 1929) the court said : 
"The conclusion is inevitable that the salarv 
which respondent is attempting to recover not hav-
ing been included in the budget for the year April 
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1, 1928, to April 1, 1929, and not being emergency 
or mandatory charge *** could not lawfully have 
been paid by the board." 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the trial court should have denied 
plaintiff relief for the reason that the record in this case 
contains nothing to warrant the conclusion that the action 
of the defendant Board w.as tantamount to the destruction 
of the office of county attorney. 
In the absence of a showing by the plaintiff of fraud, 
bad faith, abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious ac-
tion on the part of the defendant Board to whom the power 
to fix county officers salaries is given, the courts cannot 
consider the matter of the Board in so fixing such salaries 
and thus substitute their judgment for that of the Board. 
July, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted 
MITCHELL MELICH 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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